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ARTICLES
Electronic Discovery Misconduct in Litigation:
Letting the Punishment Fit the Crime
THOMAS C. TEW, ESQ.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The electronic age has redefined the way individuals conduct busi-
ness in the twenty-first century. The infiltration of computers and e-mail
into the corporate world has increased the efficiency of conducting busi-
ness - allowing access to an enormous amount of data with a stroke of a
key and enabling instantaneous communication through e-mail. The
electronic age has not only impacted the business world, but also has
impacted the practice of law, specifically the litigation arena and the
discovery process.
Computers' accessibility, ease of use, and ability to send e-mail has
exponentially increased discoverable information. Consequently, liti-
gators are forced to engage in electronic discovery and tackle unique
problems the current rules of civil procedure do not adequately address.'
On the one hand, electronic information frequently offers contemporane-
ous insight into the thinking and actions of both parties and witnesses
alike. On the other hand, electronic communication can be misleading
and prejudicial because contemporaneous electronic information often
gives rise to an unwelcome spontaneity which - when retrospectively
examined - can create an inaccurate impression.2
* Thomas Tew is a partner at Tew Cardenas LLP in Miami, Florida. Mr. Tew has extensive
experience in commercial and securities litigation.
1. Harvey L. Kaplan, Electronic Discovery in the 21st Century: Is Help on the Way?, 733
PLI/Lrr 65, 67 (2005).
2. Nicolas Varchaver, The Perils of E-mail, FORTUNE, Feb. 17, 2003, at 96 ("For
prosecutors, it has become the star witness . . . the corporate equivalent of DNA evidence, that
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This Article explores current and potential sanctions for misconduct
that occurs during the electronic discovery process. In particular, Cole-
man (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co.3 offers a rare
glimpse into the myriad paper-era sanctions, including grants of adverse
inferences and default, which can be particularly appropriate for egre-
gious discovery violations - whether electronic, paper, or a combination
thereof.4 In contrast, the Coleman cases also vividly illustrate electronic
discovery's susceptibility to discovery violations. This tension forms
the heart of the following analysis.
II. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS AND
THEIR DISCOVERY
Electronic discovery embraces a variety of information, for exam-
ple: e-mail messages, word processing files, spreadsheets, diaries, cell
phone text messages, textbook information, data from personal digital
assistants, internet use histories, and downloaded files.5 Electronic dis-
covery poses special problems compared to traditional paper document
discovery.6 As the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure noted
in its Report relating to certain previously proposed amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
[t]he discovery of electronically stored information raises markedly
different issues from conventional discovery of paper records. Elec-
tronically stored information is characterized by exponentially greater
volume than hard-copy documents. Commonly cited current exam-
ples of such volume include the capacity of large organizations' com-
puter networks to store information in terabytes, each of which
represents the equivalent of 500 million typewritten pages of plain
text, and to receive 250 to 300 million e-mail messages monthly.
Computer information, unlike paper, is also dynamic; merely turning
a computer on or off can change the information it stores. Computers
operate by overwriting and deleting information, often without the
operator's specific direction or knowledge. A third important differ-
ence is that electronically stored information, unlike words on paper,
single hair left at the crime scene that turns the entire case. In theory you can explain it away, but
good luck trying.").
3. See Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co. (Coleman II), No. CA 03-
5045 Al, 2005 WL 674885 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2005); Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v.
Morgan Stanley & Co. (Coleman 1), No. 502003CA005045XXOCAI, 2005 WL 679071 (Fla. Cir.
Ct. Mar. 1, 2005) [collectively "Coleman").
4. Coleman II, 2005 WL 679071, at *10.
5. Bradley C. Nahrstadt & Hanson L. Williams, Electronic Discovery: An Overview of the
Power and the Pitfalls, PRAc. LITIGATOR, Nov. 2005, at 25, 26; see also Kaplan, supra note 1, at
69.
6. See generally Michael R. Nelson, A Duty Everlasting: The Perils of Applying Traditional
Doctrines of Spoliation to Electronic Discovery, 12 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 14 (2006).
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may be incomprehensible when separated from the system that cre-
ated it.
7
There are many obstacles to compiling and producing electronic
discovery. In addition to requiring successful retrieval and preservation
of the information, electronic discovery poses additional challenges. For
instance, retrieving the electronic information can be costly if special
programming tools or expert technicians are required to extract the elec-
tronic information from its stored location into a usable format.8 Simi-
larly, systems may fail and, thereby, compromise or delete information. 9
Preservation obligations can also impose an economic burden on, as
well as interfere with, a party's operation of its day-to-day business.'"
Accessing, utilizing, and reconstructing electronic data is technology-
dependent, in contrast to traditional documents that merely need to be
located and gathered by anyone who could read, reconstruct, or interpret
written indices." Because machinery to replay and retrieve old storage
tapes may be obsolete or unavailable, efforts to preserve old data in new
systems frequently fail.'
2
E-mail messages raise additional issues. Do e-mail messages differ
from traditional documents, and do e-mail messages provide accurate
information? Many e-mails are flawed, impulsive, half-baked, anecdo-
tal, and discursive, instead of polished and edited. 3 The probative value
of electronically generated information varies widely: it ranges from
7. SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, at 22-23 (Sept. 2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
Reports/ST09-2005.pdf [hereinafter Report].
8. Mohammed Iqbal, The New Paradigms of E-Discovery and Cost-Shifting, 72 DEF.
COUNS. J. 283, 284 (July 2005).
9. Nahrstadt & Williams, supra note 5, at 29-30 ("Because electronically stored information
is subject to deletion at any time and because such deleted information is subject to being
overwritten at any time, there is an overriding need to act quickly early in the litigation to conduct
discovery regarding electronically stored data.").
10. See Zubalake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
11. Paul M. Robertson & Larry Stanley, E-mail Management After Zubulake: Searching for
Safe Harbours in a Sea of Adverse Instructions and Multi-Million Dollar Judgments, 733 PLI/LIT
217, 242 (2005) ("[Ilnaccessible data, meaning backup tapes and 'erased, fragmented, or damaged
data,' was not stored in a 'readily useable format' and had to be restored, de-fragmented, or
reconstructed before it could be usable."); see also Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 320.
12. Id.
13. See Steven C. Bennett, Electronic Materials and Other Discovery Considerations, 724
PLI/Lrr 111, 119 (May 2006) ("Because e-mail has a casual, informal feel, people get caught up
in the speed of sending and receiving e-mail and respond without the careful thought that would
be put in a memo."); see also Robert R. Trumble, Joshua J. Bartels, David M. Pace, and Mark A.
Yancey, Telecommuting: The Manager, the Employee, and the Technology That Connects Them,
HR ADVISOR: LEGAL & PRACTICAL GUIDANCE, Mar.-Apr. 2006, at 4 ("E-mail is often used today
as a quick and informal way of messaging. It is the most common way of delivering mail-type
messages and is on track to outpace the use of regular mail to deliver information that does not
require signatures or stamped seals.").
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extremely valuable (instantaneously preserving a snapshot in time), to
collateral transaction data of less value (but more burdensome), to
totally irrelevant information, to information that is outright misleading
and prejudicial. 4 For example, the ability to reconstruct every keys-
troke can create sideshows, such as scrutinizing every draft of an agree-
ment rather than focusing on the final agreement's terms. The computer
is changing the way in which people communicate, generating more
information, but, in the minds of many, yielding less truth. As attributed
to McLuhan, the medium is the message.' 5
This poses the threshold question of whether the discovery rules,
which were created to address the discovery of paper documents, need to
be reexamined and revised when the medium creating, generating, and
presenting the discoverable information has changed. The discovery of
electronic documents opens up new avenues of information - potential
portals to the truth - but at the risk of great burden and expense. 16 Elec-
tronic discovery, by the nature of the material and the attendant burden
and expense of retrieving it, creates two opposing gamesmanship risks:
one on the part of the discovering party and another on the part of the
responding party.
III. THE GAMES PEOPLE PLAY: THE DANGERS OF GAMESMANSHIP
Electronic discovery poses two opposing risks. First, a discovering
party may use electronic discovery as a sword, seeking to turn the
enhanced likelihood of procedural missteps into a substantive advantage
which overshadows the adjudication of the merits. Second, calculating
wrongdoers may seize on the technical nature of the electronic material
being discovered as a shield, counting on a tendency of courts to view
electronic discovery lapses as merely negligent and to be unduly forgiv-
ing of discovery lapses.' 7
14. See Jessica Lynn Repa, Comment, Adjudicating Beyond the Scope of Ordinary Business:
Why the Inaccessibility Test in Zubulake Unduly Stifles Cost-Shifting During Electronic
Discovery, 54 AM. U. L. REv. 257, 258 (2004).
15. See Todd Kappelman, Marshall McLuhan: The Medium Is the Message, PROBE
MINISTRIES, Jul. 14, 2002, available at http://www.leaderu.comorgs/probe/docs/mcluhan.html.
16. One may also wonder if electronic discovery is a "luxury good" that only pays in high-
stakes disputes. After all, the costs attendant to securing and using this type of discovery are
greater, and large litigants are the parties that primarily generate this material. See Zubulake, 217
F.R.D. at 311 ("[I]n the end, '[electronic] discovery is not just about uncovering the truth, but also
about how much of the truth the parties can afford to disinter.' ") (quoting Rowe Entm't, Inc. v.
William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)).
17. For example, in Jones v. Goord, No. 95 Civ 8026, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8707 (S.D.N.Y.
May 15, 2002), the plaintiffs' lawyers served the defendants with a document request, which, in
retrospect, could have encompassed electronic documents. Id. at 6. Plaintiffs' counsel did not
move to compel production of any electronic documents until six years into the litigation. Id. The
[Vol. 61:289
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A. The First Risk: Gamesmanship by the Discovering Party
The Solovy and Byman article, entitled There Ought to Be a Law,
focuses attention on the problems of discovery in the electronic age.' 8
The article appeared in the National Law Journal on January 27, 2003,
and was designed to provoke debate within the bar concerning electronic
discovery. 9 It postulated one hypothetical in which electronic discov-
ery could be used as a litigation weapon of choice.20 The idea was that
in cases where the burden of electronic discovery fell only on one side,
electronic discovery requests could be made so limitless, oppressive, and
unforgiving that the potential for noncompliance could be exploited to
secure an improved litigation outcome.
2'
The authors began their commentary by stating that "[t]he com-
puter age has turned David into Goliath. The computer age also has put
Goliath at a distinct, overwhelming disadvantage. 22 They then posed
the following colorful hypothetical - a "perfect storm" of discovery - to
illustrate how electronic discovery might be weaponized:
Sue Decrepe brings a sexual harassment claim against her boss, Hey-
wood Jacisme, at Nicenbig Enterprises. Sue is represented by Han
Solo, whose practice is smaller than his name; Nicenbig is repre-
sented by Thorough & Redundant, the largest law firm in the capital-
ist world.23
But it is Solo, in this electronic age, who has the economic lev-
erage. Sue alleges she was harassed, in part, via e-mail; Heywood,
she alleges, forwarded his boorish insults to his cronies, each of
whom were doing similar awful things to other poor Sues. Solo
makes a Rule 34 request for every e-mail ever sent by or to any
court denied plaintiffs' motion to compel, preventing the electronic discovery because of the
request's expense and untimely nature. Id. at 48.
18. Jerold Solovy & Robert Byman, There Ought to Be a Law, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 27, 2003, at
B6. Messrs. Solovy and Byman are members of Jenner & Block, Coleman's counsel in the
litigation discussed at length below. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See Mark D. Robins, Civil Justice Reform - Law Firms: The Duty to Preserve Evidence in
a Digital World, METRO. CORP. CouNs,, Dec. 30, 2005, at 22; see also Memorandum from David
P. O'Brien, Chief Litig. Counsel, Wachovia Sec. LLC, to the Comm. of the Fed. Judiciary on
Rules of Practice & Procedure 1-2 (Feb. 15, 2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/e-
discovery/04-CV-214.pdf ("Wachovia Corporation's comments to the Committee regarding the
proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure concerning electronic
discovery.... [T]he ease with which virtually limitless volumes of electronic information can be
created by a company's employees each day means that it can be impossible for many
corporations to track and effectively manage all electronic information generated within their
confines."); Posting of Alexander H. Lubarsky to Alextronic Discovery, http://
discoveryresources.blogspot.com/2004 01_25_discoveryresourcesarchive.html (Jan. 29, 2004).
22. Solovy & Byman, supra note 18.
23. Id.
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supervisor in Nicenbig. 50,000 employees. Average 100 e-mails per
work day per worker bee. Five years. Do the math. We're talking a
billion messages.2 4
So what does Solo get for his half-hour of effort? If Nicenbig is
to comply, it must suspend normal business operations and tie up its
computers to search and reconstruct the files.
And then it has to produce a billion pages of e-mails.. If it does
that in hard copy (get out your'calculator again) it will have a copy-
ing bill with more zeros than hit Pearl Harbor. Well, come on, you
say, no judge is going to make Nicenbig go to that cost. Maybe,
maybe not - but so long as there is discretion, there will be abuse of
discretion. We need a rule.26
The example suggests ample opportunity for the discovering party
to engage in gamesmanship under the following conditions:
1. Differential in the size of the litigants and/or their counsel;
2. Differential in the discovery burden, with one party in posses-
sion of massive discoverable information, and the other having
little;
3. Creating the discovery burden is easy; e.g. expending one-half
hour at the word processor;
4. The claim invokes issues of collateral behavior on the part of
the responding party, such as demonstrating a pattern and prac-
tice of conduct in instances other than the claimant's transac-
tion. The number of potentially comparable transactions in a
large company, e.g. hiring decisions are enormous - imposing
crushing discovery costs;
5. Enormous additional costs presented by the search for and
reconstruction of events relating to the potential electronic
evidence;
6. The risk that a court, in the exercise of discretion, may side
with the discovering party on both the scope of discovery and
the allocation of the economic burden of providing it; and
7. The risk that errors in making discovery, having little or noth-
ing to do with the underlying merits, may lead to a discovery
controversy, which, in turn, could drive the litigation outcome.
We have long known the dangers of "strike suits." Flourishing in
the area of securities litigation (not to mention consumer fraud and
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class, can leverage a tiny lOSS.27 The attendant defense process can cost
millions, and often settlements are forged around the proverbial "cost of
defense of burdensome and protracted litigation. '28 Electronic discov-
ery raises the prospect of strike suits "on steroids."
One must forestall the creation of discovery victims while at the
same time provide access to evidence. Litigation should center on the
underlying wrong, not the conduct in adjudicating the underlying
wrong.29 It is essential that the merits of the dispute, not the process for
adjudicating those merits, be case dispositive, except in cases where the
prejudice is so severe that ultimate sanctions are needed to level the
playing field, punish the deliberate wrongdoer, or deter parties from
playing games.3 °
The need for vigilance becomes ever more acute. Bad faith litiga-
tion against insurance companies, tort cases seeking punitive damages,
workplace claims based on alleged discrimination, and civil RICO and
consumer practices claims - combined with the powerful motive of the
recovery of attorneys' fees as an economic windfall beyond mere com-
pensation for the plaintiff _ have elevated litigation's economic stakes.
Raising the stakes fits hand in glove with a strategy of electronic discov-
ery gamesmanship since litigation success typically centers on demon-
strating a pattern and practice of misbehavior. Cases in which other
instances of alleged misconduct are at issue - besides the claimant's
own transaction - provide ideal growing conditions for unbridled,
unlimited discovery.
27. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 306 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating "strike suits" were
"opportunistic private plaintiffs fil[ing] securities fraud claims of dubious merit in order to exact
large settlement recoveries").
28. In re PaineWebber Ltd. P'ships Litig., 171 F.R.D. 104, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
29. Charles W. Sorenson, Jr., Disclosure Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(A) -
'Much Ado About Nothing?,' 46 HASTINGs L.J. 679, 794 (1995) ("The lawyer in possession of
evidence tending to show that the claim should not have been brought or a defense should not be
made, can no longer rely on well-worn strategies like waiting for the 'proper request,' delaying
tactics, or hoping that the other side fails to request the information. Instead, the underlying
premise of disclosure is that the outcome of civil litigation should relate more closely to the
substantive merits than to the willingness and ability of counsel to stretch partisan zealotry to its
limits at a potentially significant, unwarranted cost to the civil justice system.").
30. Hon. J. Thomas Greene, The Practice of Law: Still a Noble Profession Despite
Gamesmanship and Commercialism, 13 EXPERIENCE 20, 21 (Fall 2002) ("[D]iscovery abuse is the
foremost example of misplaced gamesmanship. Some lawyers would conduct seemingly endless
discovery by manipulating the rules that permit the taking of depositions and written
interrogatories or require production of documents. This can cause pretrial proceedings to go on
and on ad nauseam. Such tactics are employed by unscrupulous counsel to discourage or exhaust
the other side, which is often underfunded or outgunned. If left unchecked, this can result in the
protraction of litigation, needless discovery, and incredible costs. This is where case management
and control by the court should occur. Early pretrial conferences and adoption of a discovery plan
with reasonable limitations can be very effective. Then, if there are excesses, directions and
sanctions can and should be imposed to solve the problem.").
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Society ultimately bears the burden of weaponized discovery. Rou-
tine claims for bad faith and punitive damages, enhanced by the extra
burdens of electronic discovery and fencing over discovery failures, in
the end plague those who bear the economic brunt - the rank and file
consumers. 3 Litigation comprises two percent of the American gross
national product and costs each American $845.00 per year.32
B. The Second Risk: Gamesmanship by the Responding Party
There is also danger that due to the material's electronic nature,
courts will too often forgive improper conduct arising from failures to
produce electronic materials.33 This tendency begets gamesmanship by
the responding party in the hope of securing judicial forgiveness if
caught. Such improper conduct can include interposition of spurious
objections, misrepresentation as to location and availability of electronic
information, incomplete disclosure of the nature or capabilities of the
party's information technology system, misrepresentation as to destruc-
tion and recoverability of electronic material, and misrepresentation of
retrieval costs.34 The facts may be so technical as to require mediation
31. Nahrstadt & Williams, supra note 5, at 31 ("Responding to electronic discovery requests
becomes expensive not so much because of the underlying technology, but because of the
immense amount of data that must be collected and reviewed. A single back-up tape may hold
well over 50,000 e-mail messages; a company's file server may store in excess of 500,000
documents. Multiplying these figures by the number of computers or back-up tapes to be
searched demonstrates the gigantic amount of information at issue in some e-discovery
requests.").
32. R. Wagoner, A Portrait of My Industry, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2005, at A20.
33. See Concord Boat Co. v. Brunswick Co., No. LR-C-95-781, 1997 WL 33352759, at *5
(E.D. Ark. Aug. 29, 1997); see also Ophir D. Finkelthal, Scope of Electronic Discovery and
Method of Production, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1591, 1635-36 (2005) ("Where the decision to
sanction a party in the electronic document arena varies significantly from the analysis in
traditional paper discovery, is in the more complex assessment of spoliation.... The difficulty in
divining spoliation in the electronic context is illustrated by the gymnastics of the court in 'the
fifth written opinion in [Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC] . . . . In order to decide whether
sanctions are warranted, the following question must be answered: Did [the responding party] fail
to preserve and timely produce relevant information and, if so, did it act negligently, recklessly, or
willfully.' ").
34. See, e.g., Zubalake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(ordering an adverse inference instruction in a case that cost defendant $29 million); Metro. Opera
Ass'n v. Local 100, Hotel & Rest. Employees Int'l Union, 212 F.R.D. 178, 221-22 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (entering judgment against a defendant who failed to conduct an adequate search of its
electronic data sources in response to discovery requests); Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v.
Morgan Stanley & Co. (Coleman 11), 2005 WL 674885, at *10 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2005)
(ordering an adverse inference instruction in a case that ultimately cost defendant $1.45 billion);
see Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts B.V. v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., 267 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1299
(S.D. Fla. 2003) affd in part, rev'd in part, 2005 WL 850304 ("In the context of electronic
discovery, sanctions have most often been awarded where a party either intentionally or
inadvertently deletes relevant electronic documents stored on a computer system or hard drive.").
[Vol. 61:289
2007] ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY MISCONDUCT IN LITIGATION 297
by information technicians.35
The tendency to forgive misconduct is due to a variety of factors,
including:
1. The diversity and quantity of electronic material;
2. The fact that electronic material covers multiple media genera-
tions, is constantly subject to deletion or overwrite, requires
technicians to design storage facilities and mediate the recov-
ery process, and can be stored in multiple places on multiple
systems; and
3. The fact that retrieval entails multiple tasks, technical complex-
ity, and cost-benefit evaluations.
36
35. See, e.g., ADAM I. COHEN & DAVID J. LENDER, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY: LAW AND
PRACTICE § 2.09 (Aspen 2004) (discussing the possibility that "third-party computer technicians
or experts ... may be necessary in retrieving, searching, or analyzing electronic information").
36. See Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Computer Corp., 223 F.R.D. 162, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(where there was no evidence that evidence would have been favorable to requesting party and no
evidence of bad faith, sanctions were not warranted); Danis v. USN Commc'n, Inc., No. 98 C
7482, 2000 WL 1694325, at *43 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2000) (requesting party's failure to
demonstrate that missing information and documents were critical to proving their case was an
appropriate basis for denying request for sanctions); Concord Boat, 1997 WL 33352759, at *5
("[T]o hold that a corporation is under a duty to preserve all e-mail potentially relevant to any
future litigation would be tantamount to holding that the corporation must preserve all e-mail.");
In re Cheyenne Software, Inc., No. CV-94-2771(NG), 1997 WL 714891, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug.
18, 1997) (declining to issue an adverse inference instruction where defendants failed to preserve
financial information on hard drives, reasoning that plaintiffs did not clearly establish they were
prejudiced by the destruction of the information); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd.,
167 F.R.D. 90 (D. Colo. 1996) (evidence of what relevant material was actually destroyed must be
presented to determine whether spoliation occurred and whether such spoliation was an
appropriate basis for a negative inference); Lombardo v. Broadway Stores, Inc., No. G026581,
2002 WL 86810, at *8-10 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2002) (destruction of computerized payroll data,
while preserving the same information in a voluminous printed form, sufficiently prejudiced
plaintiff's ability to query the data that spoliation sanctions were appropriate); Hildreth Mfg., LLC
v. Semco, Inc., 2003-Ohio-741, 785 N.E.2d 774, 780-82 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying motion for sanctions where appellant failed to preserve magnetic
tape containing copies of computer files, but there was no evidence that the missing hard drives
contained evidence that would have been favorable to appellee); see also Martin H. Redish,
Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DuKE L.J. 561, 621 (2001) ("(1) Electronic
evidence destruction, if done routinely in the ordinary course of business, does not automatically
give rise to an inference of knowledge of specific documents' destruction, much less intent to
destroy those documents for litigation-related reasons, and (2) to prohibit such routine destruction
could impose substantial costs and disruptive burdens on commercial enterprises."). But see
Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2002) (acts of ordinary
negligence that have the effect of destroying potentially relevant data can be an appropriate basis
for discovery sanctions); Mosaid Tech. Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 348 F. Supp. 2d 332, 338 (D.
N.J. 2004) (holding that failure to institute a litigation hold on e-mail destruction, which resulted
in destruction of all technical e-mail, warranted an adverse inference instruction and monetary
sanctions because it prejudiced plaintiff, regardless of whether destruction was in bad faith);
Telecom Int'l Am., Ltd. v. AT&T Corp., 189 F.R.D. 76, 81-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding that
defendant's destruction of documents subject to existing discovery requests, although not
deliberate or in bad faith, "demonstrate[s] an indifference to its discovery obligations" that
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The technological complexities associated with electronic discov-
ery do not fully explain the frequently forgiving judicial approach to
discovery lapses. Some courts have an incomplete understanding of the
technology and processes used to generate, store, and retrieve electronic
information, and therefore they approach electronic discovery failures
with undue caution. Others have an excessive willingness to believe
technical explanations for problems, regardless of the explanations'
actual validity. The result is a tendency to indulge discovery failures
when it comes to "technology."37
Game-playing litigants can exploit this situation. Given the diffi-
culty and complexity of full production in an electronic world, which
enhances the opportunity for negligent lapses and oversights, parties
may be encouraged to practice old-fashioned fraud and then seek to dis-
guise their fraud as mere negligence. The process' very complexities,
and the limits on judicial understanding, beget this tendency. The task,
therefore, is to design procedures to prevent old-fashioned fraud from
masquerading as a negligent lapse.
Deliberate discovery misbehavior has long taken place in the pre-
electronic world.38 While paper discovery violations have at times been
shrouded in secrecy, the complexity of electronic discovery greatly
enhances the potential problem. As background to an analysis of the
electronic sanctions issue, it is useful to consider several discovery "hor-
ror stories" that arose in a paper discovery context. These cases have all
been the subject of news reports, and interestingly, involve lawyers and
law firms of the highest caliber.39 They fall into two categories: out-
right concealment and obfuscated evasion.
The sad tale of Mahlon Perkins, a former senior partner at the
major Wall Street firm of Donovan Leisure, provides an example of the
first category.' In the 1970s, Kodak was sued by upstart Berkey Photo,
required the imposition of appropriate sanctions, but did not warrant default judgment or striking
defendant's answer and counterclaims); Linnen v. A.H. Robbins Co., Inc., No. 97-2307, 1999 WL
462015, at *11-12 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 16, 1999) (negligent failure to communicate a need to
halt routine destruction of system backup tapes is nonetheless an appropriate basis for imposition
of a negative inference jury instruction and other sanctions).
37. As noted by Judge Shira Scheindlin in a recent law review article on electronic discovery
sanctions, "courts are less likely to issue written opinions when they are denying sanctions than
when they are granting them." See Shira A. Scheindlin & Kanchana Wangkeo, Electronic
Discovery Sanctions in the Twenty-First Century, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 71, 74
(2004). Accordingly, it is difficult to find empirical support for techno-indulgence.
38. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 164 F.3d 1285, 1294 (10th Cir. 1999).
39. While these incidents involve large firms, this may be due to the fact that the incidents
occurred in high-profile cases, which are better publicized or present an environment in which the
misconduct is more prone to exposure. Obviously, no category of lawyer or law firm has a
monopoly on egregious conduct.
40. See W. Keichel, The Strange Case of Kodak's Lawyers, FORTUNE, May 8, 1978, at 188.
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a film development chain, for violation of various antitrust laws.4" Don-
ovan Leisure represented Kodak.42 Perkins furnished documents to
Kodak's economics expert, who had later returned the documents to Per-
kins in a suitcase.43 When asked by Berkey's counsel what happened to
the material, Perkins said he discarded it thinking the documents were
duplicates of other documents already produced.44 However, Perkins
had lied about the status of the documents.45 He then submitted a sworn
statement affirming the lie.4 6 The suitcase remained hidden until the
final days of trial, when Perkins disclosed the fact that he lied about the
destruction of the contents of the suitcase.47 The contents of the suitcase
were then produced.48 Ironically, the material contained nothing partic-
ularly damaging to Kodak.4 9 However, the fact that Perkins had lied
under oath became a "smoking gun;" as the trial judge commented in the
Microsoft antitrust trial, "untrue in small things, untrue in all things. 5 °
After receiving an adverse jury verdict, Kodak ultimately settled the
case for a fraction of the award.51 One can only guess what motivated
Perkins.52
Another apparent case of concealment took place in the Benlate
litigation, where DuPont withheld studies regarding the effect of
Benlate, a pesticide, on the soil of farmers whose crops had been
ruined.53 DuPont and its law firm, Alston & Bird, facing possible crimi-
nal charges, agreed to pay a total of $11.25 million to settle the claims
alleging that they had withheld information during discovery.54 Of the
$11.25 million, DuPont paid $11 million, while Alston & Bird paid
41. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979).
42. Keichel, supra note 40, at 188.
43. See Robert Hinefeld, A Broader View of Discovery Ethics: The Societal Context, 2002









52. As later reported by Brian Dumaine, Kodak's Revenge on Its Law Firm, FORTUNE, May
30, 1982, at 80, Perkins served 26 days for criminal contempt; he is now president of the
Greenwich Philharmonic Orchestra in Connecticut. He has never publicly explained his
mysterious lapse, except to tell the trial judge, "I understand absolutely what I did was wrong. I
injured many people as a consequence." Interestingly, this incident came to light when another
Donovan Leisure partner was belatedly forced to disclose a letter from Kodak's expert stating the
expert had initial qualms about the defense's theory - an entirely different "smoking gun."
53. In re E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.-Benlate Litig., 99 F.3d 363, 366 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
54. See Richard Zitrin & Carol Langford, The Moral Compass: Calculated Misfeasance, LAW
NEWS NETWORK, May 7, 1999, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/newswire-article.jsp?id=
1015973958083 (membership required for access).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
$250,000. 55
The cases involving obfuscation and evasion are equally illuminat-
ing. In Washington State Physicians Insurance Exchange & Ass'n v.
Fisons Corp.,56 a drug manufactured by Fisons was alleged to have
caused permanent brain damage in a three-year-old girl, and both the
drug company and the physician were sued. 57 During discovery, the
physician requested all documents pertaining to any warning letters,
including "Dear Dr." letters and warning correspondence to the medical
profession, regarding the use of "Somophyllin Oral Liquid."58 The phy-
sician also requested copies of "any letters sent by your company to
physicians concerning theophylline toxicity in children. '59 Bogle &
Gates, the law firm for Fisons, withheld both a warning letter sent to
certain physicians and an internal client memorandum referring to "a
dramatic increase in reports of serious toxicity. ' 6° To this end, Bogle &
Gates framed discovery responses that limited their client's response to
documents referring to, or found in files denominated with, the product
name as opposed to its active ingredient.6 ' Clearly, the spirit of the
request, if not the precise letter of the request, was frustrated by the
responding party. Indeed, the Washington Supreme Court opined that
"[i]t appear[ed] clear that no conceivable discovery request could have
been made . . . that would have uncovered the relevant documents. 62
It took an anonymous whistle-blower, who sent a copy of the physi-
cian warning letter, to uncover the deception. 63 Fisons ultimately settled
the lawsuit for $6.9 million within a month after it had to disgorge the
two "smoking gun" documents.' The co-defendant physician, however,
furious at the cover-up, pressed on with the cross-claim against the drug
company. 65 After a one-month trial, the jury awarded the physician
$3.3 million, including $1.1 million for injury to his professional reputa-
tion and $2.1 million for pain and suffering, despite a finding that the
physician was 3.3 percent contributorily negligent and despite the
absence of compelling evidence of actual damages suffered by the phy-
55. Id.
56. 858 P.2d 1054 (Wash. 1993).
57. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d at 1058.
58. Id. at 1080.
59. The document requests are quoted in Stuart Taylor, Jr., Sleazy in Seattle, AMERICAN
LAWYER, April 1994, at 5, which also discusses the entire discovery episode and both the trial and
Washington Supreme Court's responses.
60. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d at 1075.
61. Id. at 1080.
62. Id. at 1083.
63. Id. at 1058.
64. Id. at 1059.
65. See Zitran & Langford, supra note 54.
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sician.66 The trial court also awarded $450,000 in attorney's fees to the
doctor, although the court rejected the doctor's discovery abuse
motion.67 On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court reversed the trial
court's discovery abuse decision as an abuse of discretion and reversed
the pain and suffering award. 68 The Supreme Court remanded the case
with instructions to punish Bogle with an amount severe enough to deter
the firm and others from engaging in such conduct. Bogle agreed to pay
$325,000 and to make a public admission of its mistake.69
Less than two years later, Bogle & Gates was involved in a claim
-brought against its client, Subaru of America.7 ° In this case, the plaintiff
alleged that the driver's seat could collapse backwards when hit from the
rear and potentially cause serious injuries to the driver.7 1 In one discov-
ery request, plaintiffs asked for National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration records that showed the collapse of driver's seats from a
rear impact force of thirty miles per hour.72 Bogle responded that thirty
miles per hour was a velocity rather than a force and that the confusion
in technical terms prevented a meaningful response. 73 A federal judge,
terming this response "lawyer hokum," directed Bogle to pay the other
side's legal fees.7 4
In a Texas case against Wal-Mart, the plaintiff - a woman who was
kidnapped from one of the retailer's parking lots - sought studies that
showed customers were more likely to be victims of crimes outside than
inside the store and that exterior security patrols appeared to effectively
limit crime.75 Wal-Mart allegedly concealed the document, claiming
that it was a survey, not a study, and therefore did not fall within the
document request. 76 The court found that Wal-Mart had made discovery
abuse "a corporate policy" and imposed an $18 million sanction against
Wal-Mart with an additional $50,000 sanction against its law firm.7 7
The National Law Journal observed that this case was one of four
actions that resulted in discovery sanctions against Wal-Mart in Texas
alone.78
66. See Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d 1054, 1059
(Wash. 1993).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1085.
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It is not difficult to postulate the lawyers' motivations in these
cases, which include the desire to please existing clients, to develop new
clients, to project a reputation as a successful litigator (i.e. the toughest
practitioner of "hardball litigation"), and to increase legal fees by
accumulating billable hours fencing over discovery disputes.79 Underly-
ing these motivations, not surprisingly, is a desire to stand out in a
crowded field, enhance income, or obtain the ego gratification of a visi-
ble public profile as a successful advocate.80
Because the client's purse is ultimately at risk, there are equally
powerful motives that can lead clients to explicitly or tacitly endorse
discovery violations.8 Clients may dupe their lawyers, particularly
where clients with internal lawyers take marching orders from manage-
ment and give marching orders to outside counsel. One is reminded of
Arthur Andersen's document non-retention episodes in the Enron mat-
ter, in which internal counsel figured prominently.8" In large organiza-
tions, internal counsel may be motivated to excel, in much the same way
as outside counsel, by securing a favorable litigation result "at all
costs."8 3 Indeed, it is not unknown for outside counsel who wishes to
play by the rules to bemoan the difficulty of securing client cooperation.
Alternatively, there may be a combination of causes in the form of
varying degrees of attorney-client collusion. By way of a descending
scale, one could note attorneys advising clients on gaming the system;
attorneys of record choosing to "see no evil" and adopting a hands-off
posture to known client impropriety; and attorneys simply failing to ask
penetrating questions for fear of receiving an awkward answer.
Past incidents are a prologue to the sanctions issue. We briefly
leave to one side the issue of discovery misconduct - magnified in the
era of electronic discovery - to consider recently enacted federal rules
amendments.
79. See generally John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery's Fatal Flaws, 84 MINN.
L. REv. 505, 509 (2000) ("[R]egardless how we define 'discovery abuse,' the increased and
apparently still increasing frequency of discovery disputes strongly suggests that over-discovery,
evasion, delay, and confrontation rather than cooperation remain problematic aspects of civil
discovery practice.").
80. Id.
81. See generally Kathleen F. Brickey, Andersen's Fall from Grace, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 917
(2003); Mary Kreiner Ramirez, The Science Fiction of Corporate Criminal Liability: Containing
the Machine Through the Corporate Death Penalty, 47 ARIz. L. REV. 933, 964-66 (2005).
82. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., Nos. MDL-1446, Civ.A. H-01-3624,
2003 WL 230688, at *19 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 28, 2003).
83. Ralph D. Cook, Reflections on Ethical Issues, 64 ALA. LAW. 226, 228 (2003) ("It has
been said that lawyers today are perceived as being 'less interested in justice and more interested
in winning at all costs.' ") (quoting Paul J. Kelly, Jr., A Return of Professionalism, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2091, 2092 (1998)).
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IV. THE 2006 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE: PREVENTING PROBLEMS BEFORE THEY ARISE
The challenge in an electronic age is to weigh relevance, however
attenuated, with probative value to decide if the discovery justifies the
resulting expense.84 Some comments are of ephemeral import. Real-
time e-mails may be of different value than after-the-fact e-mails
because some may involve actors directly involved or persons only col-
laterally involved and still others may involve the transaction in contro-
versy or only other (and possibly comparable) transactions. A proper
balance between affording relevant information through discovery and a
recognition of the burdens and expense of providing that information is
required to prevent problems from arising in the first place."
Recently, amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
considered to address these competing needs.86 The Rules have long
balanced relevance with expense. Federal Rule 26(b)(2) previously
addressed discovery limitations and, in pertinent part, provided:
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods otherwise
permitted under these rules and by any local rule shall be limited by
the court if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is unreasona-
bly cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other
source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive;
(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discov-
ery in the action to obtain the information sought; or (iii) the burden
or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit,
taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy,
the parties' resources, the importance of issues at stake in the litiga-
tion, and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the
* 87issues.
The problem was who has the burden, the party objecting or the party
seeking discovery?
In 2000, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules began work spe-
cifically to amend the Federal Rules to address problems with computer-
based discovery. 88 The Advisory Committee's stated mission was "to
devise mechanisms for providing full disclosure in a context where
potential access to information is virtually unlimited and in which full
discovery could involve burdens far beyond anything justified by the
interests of the parties to the litigation."89 With input from bar organiza-
84. Rowe Entm't, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
85. Iqbal, supra note 8, at 285.
86. Report, supra note 7.
87. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) (amended 2006).
88. Report, supra note 7, at 22.
89. Id.
. UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
tions, attorneys, academics, judges, litigants, and computer specialists,
the Advisory Committee proposed amendments to Rules .16, 26, 33, 34,
37, and 45, along with revisions to Form 35.90
Of particular note to this discussion are the amendment to Rule
26(b)(2) and the addition of Rules 26(f)(4) and 37(f).91 The amendment
to Rule 26(b)(2) addresses the production of electronically stored infor-
mation that is "not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or
cost. ' ' 92 New Rule 26(f)(4) sanctions agreements between parties relat-
ing to attorney-client privilege and the work-product privilege. 93 New
Rule 37(f) addresses the imposition of sanctions ."for failing to provide
electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine, good-
faith operation of an electronic information system."94
As amended, Rule 26(b)(2) now contains a procedure whereby a
party would initially be relieved of the obligation to produce electroni-
cally stored information that the party considers not to be reasonably
accessible, so long as they specify the sources of that information for the
requesting party.95 However, should the information's production
become an issue in the litigation, the party would then have to demon-
strate that the information is in fact "not reasonably accessible because
of undue burden or cost."' 9 6 Even if a party were to be successful in
meeting this burden, the party might still be ordered to produce the
90. Id.
91. Id. at 25.
92. Id. at 31. The amendment to Rule 26(b)(2) broke the previous rule into two subparts and
added the following third subpart:
(B) A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from
sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue
burden or cost. On motion to compel discovery or for a protective order, the party
from whom discovery is sought must show that the information is not reasonably
accessible because of undue burden or cost. If that showing is made, the court may
nonetheless order discovery from such sources if the requesting party shows good
cause, considering the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C). The court may specify
conditions for the discovery.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
93. New Rule 26(f)(4) reads as follows:
(4) [A]ny issues relating to claims of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation
material, including - if the parties agree on a procedure to assert such claims after
production - whether to ask the court to include their agreement in an order.
FED. R. Crv. P. 26(f)(4).
94. New Rule 37(f) reads as follows:
(f) Electronically stored information. Absent exceptional circumstances, a court
may not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide
electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation
of an electronic information system.
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(f).
95. Id. at 31.
96. Report, supra note 7, at 25.
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information "if the requesting party shows good cause, considering the
limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C). '97
One might question whether this is enough relief for the parties on
whom the burden falls. For example, as to discovery of matters con-
cerning the existence of a pattern and practice of behavior, the failure to
adhere to internal guidelines, the receipt of notice, the presence of mal-
ice, or the failure to correct impropriety may require an elevated stan-
dard. 98 Such standard might be analogized to the preliminary showing
of a legitimate grievance in cases under the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 or in punitive damages cases. 99 The underlying
rationale is that unless and until a threshold is passed, the cost of defense
may become outcome-determinative and strike suits, based on that
unfortunate reality, should be discouraged.1"'
Although new Rule 26(f)(4), which relates to privilege issues, is not
by its terms limited to electronic discovery, its genesis lies in the discov-
ery difficulties inherent in guarding against waiver of privilege and
work-product protection - i.e. the expenditure of time or expense and
the difficulty of identifying materials subject to a claim of privilege or
protection - which "often become more acute when discovery of elec-
tronically stored information is sought." 10 1 A cursory privilege review
could consume years of man-hours. The Rule properly recognizes that
97. As now enacted, FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C) is what was previously the portion of FED. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(2) relating to limitations on discovery.
98. See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 510 (1991) (actual malice
must be proved by clear and convincing evidence).
99. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 51 (1991) (punitive damages must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence).
100. See Cordova v. Lehman Bros,, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 131 (S.D. Fla. 2006)
("Congress found that the high costs of defending strike suits often forced defendants to settle
meritless class actions.").
101. Report, supra note 7, at C-35. The Committee explained the problems as follows:
The volume of such data, and the informality that attends use of e-mail and some
other types of electronically stored information, may make privilege determinations
more difficult, and privilege review correspondingly more expensive and time
consuming. Other aspects of electronically stored information pose particular
difficulties for privilege review. For example, production may be sought of
information automatically included in electronic files but not apparent to the creator
or to readers. Computer programs may retain draft language, editorial comments,
and other deleted matter (sometimes referred to as "embedded data" or "embedded
edits") in an electronic file but not make them apparent to the reader. Information
describing the history, tracking, or management of an electronic file (sometimes
called "metadata") is usually not apparent to the reader viewing a hard copy or a
screen image. Whether this information should be produced may be among the
topics discussed in the Rule 26(f) conference. If it is, it may need to be reviewed to
ensure that no privileged information is included, further complicating the task of
privilege review.
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inadvertent production of privileged e-mail, for example, should not
result in a general subject matter waiver. 1 2 Rather, the Rule would
allow the parties to enter into agreements both to establish procedures
for asserting claims of privilege and work-product protection after pro-
duction and to have their agreement entered as an order of the court.0 3
New Rule 37(f)'s safe harbor provision recognizes the fact that,
during the "routine operation of an electronic information system,"
information is modified, overwritten, and deleted.'0 4 As such, the Rule
seeks to provide parties some limited protection from sanctions when
they are unable to produce electronically stored information because it
has been destroyed in the course of the routine operations of the parties'
electronic information systems.10 5 In presenting the proposed addition
to Rule 37, the Committee emphasized, however, that the Rule "is not
intended to provide a shield for parties that intentionally destroy infor-
mation because of its relationship to litigation by, for example, exploit-
ing the routine operation of an information system to target specific
electronically stored information for destruction in order to avoid pro-
ducing that information in discovery."'0 6
The new Rule 37(f) provides a safe harbor only to those litigants
who act in good faith and, then, only absent exceptional circum-
stances.O°7 As the Committee Note to the then-proposed Rule stated:
"[G]ood faith [in the routine operation of an information system] may
require that a party intervene to suspend certain features of the routine
operation of an information system to prevent loss of information sub-
ject to preservation obligations."' o0 8
The adopted Rule amendments go a long way toward addressing
the relevance-burden dichotomy and the mistake issues, but they only
address the first abuse; i.e. establishing limits on the party seeking dis-
covery and protecting the party against whom discovery is sought. 109
The amendments leave the second abuse, gamesmanship to evade dis-
covery, to the preexisting sanctions structure." 1 But, even as to the first
abuse, there are many opportunities for improvement in the Rules."
102. Report, supra note 7.
103. Id. at C-62.
104. Id. at C-83
105. Id. at C-84.
106. Id.
107. Id. at C-85.
108. Id. at C-87.
109. See generally Report, supra note 7.
110. Nelson, supra note 6, at 49 (Committee Note makes clear that courts will continue to have
significant discretion to impose sanctions for "wrong guess" as to precise moment when litigation
hold should be applied).
11l. Id. ("The Committee Note makes it clear that the extent of a party's preservation
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For example, one might consider establishing additional safe harbors
based on generally accepted system operation and performance method-
ology. This would encourage the implementation of better systems to
file, index, retain, and retrieve electronic documents. The adoption of a
generally accepted information technology convention, when operated
properly and certified by a third-party evaluator, might afford immunity
from further discovery obligations or penalties."12 One might also fash-
ion a safe harbor provision that prohibits further electronic discovery
where all electronic messages are contemporaneously reduced to paper.
At the same time, one might consider correcting the bilateral
requirement of Rule 26(f)(4), which leaves the issue of waiver of privi-
lege to the parties' discretion." 3 In situations where one party's discov-
ery burden is light and the other's is heavy, there would be no incentive
for the party having the light discovery burden to agree to non-waiver of
an assertion of privilege after production. Moreover, the Rule ignores
the harm that may result simply by giving opposing counsel the opportu-
nity to view the privileged document or work product." 4
Finally, the requirement of Rule 37(f), the comments to which
make clear that once a party is aware of potential litigation it must take
steps to protect relevant electronic information in order to avail itself of
the protection afforded by the safe harbor rule, poses several
problems." 5 What exactly is the trigger point for the "litigation hold"
obligation? Is it the actual filing of a complaint, or is an oral communi-
cation of intent to sue sufficient? Placing a "litigation hold" on elec-
obligations with regard to electronic discovery will remain dependent upon pre-existing common
law. Therefore, the proposed Rule will continue to provide courts with significant discretion in
which to make after-the-factdeterminations of when a party was required to place a 'litigation
hold' on the destruction of electronic discovery.").
112. Interestingly, installation of such a system might have a collateral benefit: renewed focus
on the issue of what gets recorded in the first place. To eliminate extraneous documents or
prejudicial references, businesses might establish employee practices for what to record and the
medium in which to record it. One is reminded of the old dictum: "never create a memo, never
throw one away." See Diana Gale Matthiesen, Is HTML E-mail Really "Better" than ASCII Text
E-mail?, http://www.dgmweb.net/genealogy/Ancillary/OnE/ASCIIvHTML.shtml (last visited
Aug. 27, 2006). There is nothing wrong with a disciplined approach to document creation or
information generation. For years, large firm accountants have been instructed on work-paper's
litigation implications, specifically what not to record and how not to say it. They receive
instructions regarding the retention of notes and drafts; in fact, these firms have formal policies on
work paper retention. Few would question the ethics of "real time" (pre-litigation) document-
creation practices. Similarly, experts hired to testify at trial routinely destroy all drafts of reports
prior to issuing final reports. Obviously, long and hard experience has shown the mischief that
can occur when an opposing lawyer twists tentative remarks out of their proper context.
113. See Report, supra note 7, at C-62.
114. See Report, supra note 7.
115. See also Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 704 (2005) (recognizing
the permissibility of document retention systems).
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tronic information can be an expensive prospect for a company and can
seriously interfere with the operation of its business. It is not something
that courts should arbitrarily order.
Underlying these concerns are fundamental decisions regarding the
legal system's preferences and values. Discovery exists, at least in sig-
nificant part, to equip a party with the information necessary to prove a
case: discovery can be sought if it is merely likely to lead to the discov-
ery of admissible evidence - a standard the courts have applied expan-
sively.1 16 The issues surrounding electronic discovery provide us with
useful cause to re-examine some of the assumptions about discovery and
some of the "sacred cow" notions, which emerged during an era of paper
documents. In an electronic age, one might decide basic issues of socie-
tal values or litigation philosophy differently.
The mere ability to lead to discoverable evidence may be too liberal
of a discovery standard. While "smoking guns" should be uncovered,
some restriction on discovery access is not a denial of justice. The cur-
rent system already includes some discovery restrictions: e.g. limits of
twenty-five interrogatories and ten depositions." 17 Moreover, briefs are
often limited to a prescribed number of pages." 8 It is difficult to seri-
ously contend that limits on access to discovery deny a fair case resolu-
tion, or that unlimited access to discovery will produce a fair one.
In the end, it may all be a question of societal choices, the law
being the mediator of societal relationships with one's view depending
upon whose ox is being gored. Nevertheless, the electronic discovery
debate should properly address our collective value choices.
V. THE COLEMAN DECISION - AN EXAMPLE BY CONTRAST
The Coleman cases present an example of an all too frequent ten-
dency to exploit judicial electronic discovery permissiveness to perpe-
trate old-fashioned fraud. In Coleman, the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in
and for Palm Beach County, Florida, addressed the issue of whether to
grant Coleman Holdings, Inc. ("CPH") an adverse inference instruction
due to the misconduct of Morgan Stanley & Co." 9 Morgan Stanley's
misconduct included the destruction of e-mails and its failure to comply
with the court's Agreed Order requiring a search for backup tapes and
review e-mails, production of non-privileged e-mails, and certification
116. Discovery is also designed to prevent unfair surprise at trial.
117. FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a); FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a).
118. See, e.g., S.D. FLA. LOCAL R. 7.1.C.2.
119. Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc.v. Morgan Stanley & Co. (Coleman I), No.
502003CA005045XXOCAI, 2005 WL 679071, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 1, 2005).
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of compliance with the Agreed Order. 20  The court subsequently
addressed Morgan Stanley's continuing discovery violations on CPH's
Renewed Motion for Entry of Default Judgment - which the court
granted, in part.'
2 1
CPH claimed that Morgan Stanley was complicit in a fraud com-
mitted by Sunbeam Corporation that caused CPH to end up with more
than 14 million shares of essentially worthless Sunbeam stock.12 2 The
Sunbeam fraud took place primarily in 1997 and 1998.23 Prior to trial,
Morgan Stanley engaged in epic discovery misconduct. 124 The discov-
ery misconduct ultimately led the court to "read to the jury the statement
of facts ...during whatever evidentiary phase of CHP's case that it
requests," reasoning that Morgan Stanley had so interfered with the pro-
cess of searching for the truth regarding its prior motives and conduct
that a fair trial on all elements of CPH's claims would be impossible.
125
Additionally, the court held that Morgan Stanley "shall bear the burden
of proving to the jury, by the greater weight of the evidence, that it
lacked knowledge of the Sunbeam fraud."'
' 2 6
The Florida discovery sanction rules governed the disposition of
the Coleman cases.'2 7 The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, however,
track the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as amended through 1970
and, therefore, do not incorporate recent, post-1970 refinements. 2 8 The
scope of discovery is set out in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.280(b):
(1) In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter,
not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter of the pending
action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking
discovery or the claim or defense of any other party, including the
existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any
books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and loca-
tion of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter.' 2 9
120. Id.
121. Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co. (Coleman I), No. CA 03-5045
Al, 2005 WL 674885, at *13 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2005).
122. Coleman II, 2005 WL674885, at *16; Coleman 1, 2005 WL 679071, at *1.
123. Coleman 1, 2005 WL 679071, at *1.
124. Id. at *6.
125. Id. at *7; Coleman H, 2005 WL674885, at *10.
126. Coleman 1, 2005 WL 679071, at *7.
127. See generally Coleman 11, 2005 WL674885; Coleman 1, 2005 WL 679071.
128. Ruiz ex rel. Ruiz v. Brea, 489 So. 2d 1136, 1137 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (stating
Rule 1.280 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure was patterned after Rule 26 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure); Alachua Gen. Hosp. v. Zimmer USA, Inc., 403 So. 2d 1087, 1088 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (same).
129. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b). The scope of document discovery is set out in Rule 1.350(a) of
the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure:
(a) Request; Scope. Any party may request any other party (1) to produce and
permit the party making the request, or someone acting in the requesting party's
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The Florida sanction rules also expressly provide for either the dis-
missal of an action where the plaintiff is disobedient to a court order, or
the rendering of a default judgment where the disobedient party is the
defendant. 3 ' Rule 1.380(b) provides:
(2) If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or
a person designated under rule 1.310(b)(6) or 1.320(a) to testify
on behalf of a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit
discovery, including an order made under subdivision (a) of this
rule or rule 1.360, the court in which the action is pending may
make any of the following orders:
(C) An order striking out pleadings or parts of them or stay-
ing further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dis-
missing the action or proceeding or any part of it, or
rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient
party.
(D) Instead of any of the foregoing orders or in addition to
them, an order treating as a contempt of court the failure
to obey any orders except an order to submit to an
examination made pursuant to rule 1.360(a)(1)(B) or
subdivision (a)(2) of this rule.
Instead of any of the foregoing orders or in addition to them, the
court shall require the party failing to obey the order to pay the rea-
sonable expenses caused by the failure, which may include attorneys'
fees, unless the court finds that the failure was justified or that other
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
13 1
The Coleman decision involved three kinds of discovery miscon-
duct by Morgan Stanley: (a) failure to disclose responsive communica-
tions; (b) failure to produce known responsive communications; and (c)
active concealment of the misconduct. 32 In the final analysis, much of
that discovery misconduct had little or nothing to do with the electronic
nature of the discovery material being sought. 133 Instead, the case con-
behalf, to inspect and copy any designated documents, including writings, drawings,
graphs, charts, photographs, phono-records, and other data compilations from which
information can be obtained, translated, if necessary, by the party to whom the
request is directed through detection devises into reasonably usable form, that
constitute or contain matters within the scope of rule 1.280(b) and that are in the
possession, custody, or control of the party to whom the request is directed; ....
FLA. R. Cirv. P. 1.350(a).
130. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.380.
131. Id.
132. See Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc.v. Morgan Stanley & Co. (Coleman I), No.
502003CA005045XXOCAI, 2005 WL 679071, at *1-9 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 1, 2005).
133. See generally id.
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cerned failures to make proper discovery of internal and external com-
munications that would have been improper if they arose in a paper
discovery context. 34 In other words, while the context of the discovery
misconduct in Coleman was electronic, the decision's true meaning
revolves around punishing both old-fashioned discovery fraud and fraud
on the court.
1 35
A. The Morgan Stanley Misconduct
1. MISCONDUCT INVOLVING DELIBERATE NON-PRODUCTION OF
ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS AND COVER-UP OF THE
NON-PRODUCTION
The first type of Coleman discovery misconduct that led to the par-
tial default judgment involved the deliberate non-production of elec-
tronic documents (i.e. relevant e-mails) and the cover-up of that non-
production. 136 Morgan Stanley was found, based on extensive evidence,
to have engaged in a wide range of improper discovery misbehavior: (1)
actively misrepresenting the company's ability to recover old e-mails
from the relevant time period by concealing the existence of a Morgan
Stanley archive that was easily searchable; (2) falsely certifying full
compliance with the narrow e-mail production order that resulted from
concealment of the archive, even though Morgan Stanley knew of hun-
dreds of unreviewed backup tapes; (3) consistently misrepresenting the
relevant facts after circumstances later forced Morgan Stanley to reveal
the existence of the unsearched tapes; and (4) failing to locate thousands
of additional unsearched backup tapes until the eve of trial, despite
repeated assurances that complete searches had been performed.
1 37
Although Morgan Stanley's misbehavior amounted to deliberate
concealment of evidence and lying to cover-up that concealment, it had
little or nothing to do with electronic issues; rather, it merely arose in the
context of electronic documents. 38 It was akin to deliberately failing to
look in the correct filing cabinets and closing one's eyes to the existence
of other filing cabinets known or suspected to contain relevant files and
then dissembling about what had taken place.
a. Hiding the Archive
The Coleman discovery saga began innocently. Both sides
exchanged reciprocal discovery requests which were commonplace for
134. See id. at *2-6.
135. Id.
136. Id. at *5.
137. Id.
138. See id. at *6.
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litigation of this magnitude. 139 Morgan Stanley's initial response to the
routine document requests was to produce only a handful of e-mails,
despite testimony that the company was handling approximately
6,000,000 e-mails per week in 1999.140
After Morgan Stanley failed to respond to an October 2003 letter
from CPH requesting that Morgan Stanley search backup tapes for
responsive e-mails, CPH filed a motion to compel.141 CPH's motion
requested that Morgan Stanley be required to "make a full investigation
for e-mail messages, including a search of magnetic tapes and hard
drives." 142 Morgan Stanley opposed the motion, claiming that such a
search would be extraordinarily expensive and that restoration would be
futile because its previous policy of overwriting backup tapes every
twelve months meant that the tapes could not contain e-mails generated
prior to 2000.143
Negotiations aimed at resolving the dispute ensued.' 44 Morgan
Stanley rejected CPH's offers to have a third-party vendor search both
parties' data for responsive materials and to have the parties split the
cost of such search evenly - a deal that would likely have provided
significant savings to Morgan Stanley. 4 5 Throughout these negotia-
tions, CPH relied on Morgan Stanley's assertions that all of its e-mail
from the time period at issue was on hard-to-search backup tapes that
had, for the most part, been overwritten in any event.146 Morgan Stan-
ley's corporate representative on discovery issues, Robert Saunders, tes-
tified that the company was building an e-mail archive that would allow
easy searching and production, but was being loaded only with new e-
mails as they were generated. 14 7 The archive, therefore, would not con-
tain e-mails prior to January 2001.148
In fact, and as CPH learned on the eve of trial, this was not true. 14 9
Morgan Stanley's e-mail archive was slated to hold all pre-2000 e-mail
and already had been loaded with material from thousands of "historic"
139. See Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co. (Coleman II), No. CA 03-
5045 Al, 2005 WL 674885, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2005).
140. Id.
141. Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc.v. Morgan Stanley & Co. (Coleman I), No.
502003CA005045XXOCAI, 2005 WL 679071 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 1, 2005), at *1, *7.
142. Coleman I, 2005 WL 674885, at *1.
143. Id. at *2.
144. Id.
145. Id. at *2.
146. See id.
147. Id. at *5 n.12.
148. Id.
149. See id. at *3 n.4; Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc.v. Morgan Stanley & Co. (Coleman I),
No. 502003CA005045XXOCAI, 2005 WL 679071 at *4 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 1, 2005).
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backup tapes at the time of Saunders's false testimony. 50 In effect,
Morgan Stanley had lied, and its lie was tantamount to saying it did not
have filing cabinets containing relevant evidence which it knew it
possessed.
b. Falsely Certifying Compliance with the Agreed Order
Relying on misrepresentations that Morgan Stanley's pre-2000 e-
mail was either nonexistent or overly burdensome to search, the parties
entered an Agreed Order on April 16, 2004. 1" Under the Agreed Order,
Morgan Stanley was obligated to: (1) identify the oldest full backup e-
mail tapes for specific employees and former employees; (2) search
those tapes for e-mails from a certain date range or containing certain
keywords relating to the transaction; (3) produce, by May 14, 2004, both
responsive e-mails and a privilege log; and (4) certify, by May 14, 2004,
that it had fully complied with the Agreed Order.
1 52
On May 14, 2004, Morgan Stanley produced 1,300 pages of e-mail
but failed to provide the required certification.'5 3 On June 23, 2005, and
after repeated demands by CPH, Morgan Stanley finally produced a Cer-
tificate of Compliance signed by Arthur Riel, a senior Information Tech-
nology staffer at Morgan Stanley who later became a
"whistleblower." 154
As CPH would later learn on the eve of trial, Riel's certification
was wholly inaccurate: from the moment he signed it, both Riel and in-
house counsel knew of thousands of tapes that Morgan Stanley had com-
pletely failed to search.'5 5 These consisted of 738 8-mm tapes discov-
ered in Manhattan during 2002 and 1,423 DLT tapes discovered in
Brooklyn before May 2004.156 Neither set of tapes had been loaded on
the secret archive by June 2004.157
Despite this knowledge, Morgan Stanley issued its Certificate of
Compliance, knowing full well that it had not searched these thousands
150. Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co. (Coleman II), No. CA 03-5045
Al, 2005 WL 674885, at *5 nn. 11-12 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2005).
151. Id. at *3.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at *3. Although CPH did not effectively learn this information until March 2005, it
turned out that by August 2004, Arthur Riel had been effectively fired by Morgan Stanley and had
gone to the SEC as a whistleblower, leading to an investigation into the company's e-mail
retention and destruction policies. Id. at *7; Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc.v. Morgan Stanley &
Co. (Coleman I), No. 502003CA005045XXOCAI, 2005 WL 679071, at *2 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 1,
2005).
155. Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co. (Coleman 11), No. CA 03-5045
Al, 2005 WL 674885, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2005); Coleman I, 2005 WL 679071, at *2.
156. Coleman 1, 2005 WL 679071, at *2.
157. Id.
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of tapes. 158 Morgan Stanley also falsely suggested that it had searched
individual tapes, thereby continuing to conceal the existence of the
archive and its easy searching capabilities. 159 Moreover, soon after the
certificate was issued, Riel and the lawyers learned that the unsearched
tapes contained e-mails from the relevant time period. 160 Morgan Stan-
ley, however, failed to withdraw the Certificate of Compliance, failed to
proceed with searching those tapes, and failed to disclose that additional
e-mail discovery might be required by the court order with which it had
already certified as constituting "full compliance."' 16' Morgan Stanley
deceived both its adversary and the court regarding compliance with a
consented discovery order and compounded that deceit when it learned
of additional facts that augmented the known falsity of its certifica-
tion. 62 Morgan Stanley's failure to correct any of these issues further
compounded its prior deceit. 1
63
c. Making False Representations When the Existence of Unsearched
Tapes Had to Be Revealed
All remained quiet on the electronic-discovery front, at least as far
as CPH was aware, until November 17, 2004, when Morgan Stanley was
forced by collateral circumstances to reveal that it had not previously
complied with the Agreed Order to produce e-mail. 164 But Morgan
Stanley still failed to come clean. Morgan Stanley simply stated that it
had "discovered additional e-mail backup tapes," that some of the data
on those "newly discovered" tapes had been restored, and that searches
were being re-run. 165 A day later, Morgan Stanley produced approxi-
mately 8,000 pages of e-mail. 166 Morgan Stanley did not say, however,
that this constituted a complete production.' 67 Despite CPH's repeated
requests, Morgan Stanley provided no other information, such as when
the tapes were found, how many tapes existed, whether the tapes were
restored, how much data they contained, how many e-mails they con-




161. Coleman 1, 2005 WL 679071, at *5.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at *3. As discussed in note 154, supra, because Riel had been fired and had
approached the SEC, it must have become evident to in-house counsel that the falsity of Riel's
certificate of compliance would eventually be revealed.
165. Id.
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On January 26, 2005, as a result of Morgan Stanley's suspicious
stonewalling, CPH filed a Motion for Adverse Inference Instruction Due
to Morgan Stanley's Destruction of E-mails and Morgan Stanley's Non-
Compliance with the Agreed Order. 169 In a hearing a few days later,
Morgan Stanley's counsel continued to dissemble, falsely representing
to the court that the Brooklyn tapes were found "sometime during the
summer" of 2004, that the 8-mm tapes were found on November 4,
2004, and that no one in Morgan Stanley's Law Division knew the
unsearched tapes contained e-mail until late October 2004.' 7°
The court granted CPH's request that a third-party vendor be
retained at Morgan Stanley's expense to search the additional backup
tapes for e-mails which met the Agreed Order's terms.' 7 The court also
scheduled an evidentiary hearing for February 14, 2005, at which Mor-
gan Stanley would be given an opportunity to present evidence explain-
ing the deficiencies that had been uncovered by that time.'72
It was at the February 14, 2005 hearing that Morgan Stanley's mis-
conduct - the archive hiding, the failure to comply with the Agreed
Order, and the earlier false statements about the circumstances relating
to the unsearched backup tapes - began to surface. 7 3 Partly based on
these facts, the court ultimately ordered on March 1, 2005, that Morgan
Stanley bear the burden of proof on several elements of the fraud
claims.' 74 The court reasoned that it was not fair to saddle CPH with
such burdens given Morgan Stanley's failure to comply with basic dis-
covery obligations. 75
Following the February 14, 2005 hearing, and before the court had
entered the March 1 Order, CPH continued to pursue Morgan Stanley
for its discovery misconduct based, in part, on Morgan Stanley's then
regular discoveries of new e-mail tapes. 176 The court ordered Morgan
169. Id. at *4.
170. Id.
171. Coleman 1, 2005 WL 679071, at *5.
172. Id. at *4.
173. Id.
174. Id. at *6.
175. Id. At the February 14, 2005 hearing, there was also considerable testimony regarding
new unsearched tapes found during January and February 2005 - indeed, some were found as
recently as the day before the hearing. Id. at *4. These tapes were sitting in obvious locations in
Morgan Stanley's IT department, thus making it clear that no serious effort to find the entire set of
existing backup tapes had been made. Id. The pattern of finding more and more unsearched tapes
continued after February 14, 2005. Id. at *5. All told, by March 2005, Morgan Stanley informed
the court that it had found approximately 7,000 tapes that had not been searched when Morgan
Stanley certified compliance with the Agreed Order in June 2004. Coleman I, 2005 WL 674885
at *7. In other words, it was as if Morgan Stanley was "discovering" intentionally misplaced
filing cabinets up to the eve of trial.
176. Coleman 1, 2005 WL 679071, at *4.
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Stanley to produce, at CPH's request, documents in which Morgan Stan-
ley described its e-mail production capabilities to other litigants and
information related to Arthur Riel's employment status.17 7 Through
these productions, CPH learned both that Morgan Stanley had been the
subject of a Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigation
into its alleged destruction of backup tapes and that the archive had
greater problems than those disclosed at the February 14, 2005 hear-
ing.178 CPH also learned, based on preliminary information from the
court-ordered third-party vendor that was reviewing Morgan Stanley's
work, that many tapes which Morgan Stanley had claimed contained no
e-mail did, in fact, contain e-mail.
179
Due to these discoveries, CPH asked for and was granted permis-
sion to depose Arthur Riel and to re-depose Allison Gorman, Riel's suc-
cessor at Morgan Stanley. 180 Based on information revealed in these
depositions and related discovery, CPH asked that the order shifting the
burden of proof be changed to a default judgment and that the court set
another evidentiary hearing for March 14 and 15, 2005.181
Much new information had come to light since the February 14,
2005 hearing. Most importantly, it had become clear that Morgan Stan-
ley went to great lengths to conceal the backup-tape destruction, which
triggered the SEC investigation into the company's failure to follow reg-
ulatory rules concerning electronic information retention.' 82 In Decem-
ber 2002, Morgan Stanley settled alleged rules violations relating to this
practice with the SEC, New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and agreed to pay a
$1.65 million fine.' 83 Not only did Morgan Stanley tell the SEC and
CPH different stories concerning critical facts, the company intention-
ally omitted a key document from its privilege log and violated court
orders regarding the production of e-mail-related documents.1 84 At the
same time, Morgan Stanley misrepresented the status of its e-mail
177. Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co. (Coleman I1), No. CA 03-5045
Al, 2005 WL 674885, at *6 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2005).
178. Id. at 7.
179. Id. at *5 n. 6.
180. Susanne Craig, How Morgan Stanley Botched a Big Case by Fumbling E-mails, WALL ST.
J., May 16, 2005, at Al, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/05136/505304.stm; http://
courtcon.co.palm-beach.fl.us/pls/jiwp/ck-pubic-qry-doct.cp-dktrpt-docket-report?case-id=5020
03CA005045XXOCAI&begindate=&end-date= (last visited Jan. 12, 2007) (Coleman I docket
entries).
181. Coleman 11, 2005 WL 674885, at *1.
182. Id. at *5.
183. How Did Morgan Stanley Defraud Investors?, http://www.securitiesfraudfyi.com/
morgan.stanley.html (last visited July 28, 2006).
184. Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co. (Coleman 11), No. CA 03-5045
Al, 2005 WL 674885, at *5 n. 7 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2005).
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archive, which contained more data and performed more accurate
searches than it represented.
85
Based on this evidence, along with the other discovery misconduct,
the court ultimately revised its sanction and entered a partial default
judgment.186 Effectively, Morgan Stanley told CPH and the court a
series of lies that were compounded by another series of subsequent lies
intended to cover-up-the underlying series of initial lies - lies upon lies,
upon lies.'8 7 Disclosure of the falsity took place only when necessitated
by outside events, and then only to the extent that Morgan Stanley felt
compelled to make some form of disclosure.' 88
2. CONCEALMENT OF KEY EXECUTIVE'S BACKGROUND
In addition to misconduct arising from the production of electronic
documents, Morgan Stanley engaged in a second area of serious discov-
ery misconduct relating to the discovery of materials involving William
Strong, a Morgan Stanley managing director who in many ways was the
driving force behind the Sunbeam deal.'89
This misconduct began near the litigation's inception. CPH's first
discovery request sought "[a]ll documents concerning [Strong's]
employment contracts, performance evaluations, and/or personnel files
(including without limitation any documents that describe or discuss
[his] training, experience, competence, and accomplishments)."' 190 Mor-
gan Stanley refused, insisting that such documents were not relevant and
would, therefore, infringe on Strong's privacy interests.' 91 On March
15, 2004, the court ordered Morgan Stanley to produce "[a]ll references
(positive or negative) to [Strong's] truthfulness, veracity, or moral
turpitude."'
192
When limited portions of Strong's evaluations were produced in
185. Id. at *5.
186. Id. at *9.
187. See generally Coleman II, 2005 WL 674885; Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc.v. Morgan
Stanley & Co. (Coleman 1), No. 502003CA005045XXOCAI, 2005 WL 679071 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
Mar. 1, 2005).
188. See generally Coleman 11, 2005 WL 674885; Coleman 1, 2005 WL 679071. Morgan
Stanley's situation worsened when the court received considerable testimony during the February
and March 2005 hearings regarding various "glitches" in the software used to search the e-mail
archive. Coleman 11, 2005 WL 674885, at *6. Prior searches needed to be redone after the
various glitches were revealed and repaired, rendering Morgan Stanley's other excuses all the
more problematic. Id. The software glitches were not a primary focus of the sanctions orders
since it was unclear whether they flowed from deliberate misconduct. See id. at *5.
189. Craig, supra note 180.
190. Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co. (Coleman II), No. CA 03-5045
Al, 2005 WL 674885, at *8 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2005).
191. Id.
192. Id.
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response to the March 15 order, it became clear that Strong's colleagues
had held reservations about his candor and ethical compass. 193 Strong's
evaluators, Joseph Perella and Tarek Abdel-Meguid, gave only vague
explanations of those concerns. 194 Morgan Stanley withheld Strong's
1994 performance evaluation, even after CPH specifically requested it in
spring 2004, on the grounds that the document was non-responsive.
95
When the evaluation was finally produced during the court's hearing on
CPH's default motion on March 15, 2005, it became clear that the docu-
ment was responsive to the court's initial order and had been wrongly
withheld. '96
In the midst of Morgan Stanley's evasive tactics and vague expla-
nations, CPH continued to independently investigate Strong. On Janu-
ary 25, 2005, counsel for CPH obtained a copy of a November 10, 1998
news article describing an investigation by Italian authorities into allega-
tions that Strong had been complicit in a foreign bribery scheme. 197 As
it turned out, Strong had been indicted in Italy for alleged complicity,
while working for Salomon Brothers International in the 1992 formation
of a joint venture with Italian companies, that involved bribing various
Italian officials.
198
Morgan Stanley was aware of Strong's prosecution, but failed to
produce the requested documents relating to it, even after the court
ordered production of documents relating to Strong's "truthfulness,
veracity, or moral turpitude."' 99 Morgan Stanley initially argued that
Strong's prosecution did not occur until after the Sunbeam deal had
closed in March 1998.2 o Therefore, Morgan Stanley argued, CPH was
not to be entitled to any inference that the Italian investigation gave
Strong an incentive to engage in fraud relating to Sunbeam in order to
boost his fees and cement his position at Morgan Stanley.2' Discovery
showed, however, that the Notice of Prosecution was filed and sent to
Morgan Stanley in April 1996.2o2 The court-ordered production of more
than 350 documents in February 2005 also showed that Morgan Stan-
193. Id. at *8.
194. Id.
195. Id. at *9.
196. Id.
197. See id. at *8; see also Susan Beck, Morgan Stanley's Recipe for Disaster: Discovery
Abuses, a Preoccupied GC and an Overconfident Law Firm Helped Create a $1.6 Billion Fiasco
for Morgan Stanley, AMERICAN LAWYER, April 1, 2006, at 88, available at http://www.law.con/
jsp/ihc/PubArticleIHC.jsp?id= 1149239119470.
198. Craig, supra note 180.
199. Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co. (Coleman II), No. CA 03-5045
Al, 2005 WL 674885, at *8 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2005).
200. Id. at *8 n.16.
201. Id.
202. Id. at *8.
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ley's counsel in the Sunbeam transaction, Davis, Polk & Wardwell, had
served as Strong's counsel in the Italian criminal prosecution at Morgan
Stanley's request.2 °3 Morgan Stanley had been aware of Strong's
involvement in the Italian prosecutor's investigation since at least late
1993.20
The privilege logs that Morgan Stanley produced in connection
with these revelations demonstrated even further misconduct. First, the
logs erased any doubt as to whether Morgan Stanley knew about the
Strong prosecution when it received CPH's requests and the court's
order for discovery.0 5 Morgan Stanley's current general counsel, Don-
ald Kempf, appeared in the privilege logs concerning events surrounding
the Strong prosecution.206 In addition, a managing director in charge of
litigation appeared more than eighty times in the privilege logs concern-
ing events surrounding the Strong prosecution.20 7 Thus, Morgan Stanley
executives clearly knew of the Strong prosecution at the time the com-
pany responded to CPH's discovery requests.
Furthermore, the logs revealed that Morgan Stanley was claiming
privilege over documents that had been shared with third parties.20 8
Morgan Stanley first sought to defend its privilege claims by arguing
that it was in a joint-defense agreement with the Italian and American
law firms that represented Strong and Salomon Brothers. 2 9 But, when
that claim was put to the test, and the court reviewed the documents in
camera, it became clear that no such agreement existed 10
Accordingly, CPH was permitted access to additional documents
relating to Strong and his prosecution.21 1 This misconduct, like the elec-
tronic document misconduct, helped form the basis for the court's
March 23, 2005 partial default order.212
B. Analysis of the Coleman Court's Sanctions Decision
On March 1, 2005, the Coleman court entered a sanctions order:
(i) Granting CPH's motion for an adverse inference instruc-
tion due to Morgan Stanley's destruction of e-mails and









211. Id. at *9.
212. Id. at *8-9.
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(ii) Requiring Morgan Stanley to use its best efforts to comply
with two previous court orders relating to production of e-
mails and the searching of e-mail back-up tapes;
(iii) Providing for the reading to the jury of a statement of
facts setting forth (a) Morgan Stanley's violation of a fed-
eral regulation requiring the preservation of e-mails for
three years and their preservation in a readily accessible
place for two years; (b) Morgan Stanley's certification to
the Court of full compliance with the April 16, 2004 order
relating to the production of e-mails, when, in fact, it was
aware at the time of the certification of the existence of
2161 back-up tapes that had not been searched; (c) Mor-
gan Stanley's delay in taking any steps to search known
back-up tapes for relevant e-mails; (d) Morgan Stanley's
late discovery of 200 back-up tapes openly stored in loca-
tions known to be used for tape storage; and (e) Morgan
Stanley's delay in advising CPH of the discovery of addi-
tional back-up tapes;
(iv) Allowing CPH to argue to the jury that Morgan Stanley's
concealment of its role in the Sunbeam transaction is evi-
dence of malice or evil intent, going to the issue of puni-
tive damages; and
(v) Placing the burden on Morgan Stanley of proving to the
jury, by the greater weight of the evidence, that it lacked
knowledge of the Sunbeam fraud and did not aid and abet
or conspire with Sunbeam to defraud CPH. 13
The Morgan Stanley discovery violations that prompted the March
1, 2005 sanctions order were not the result of any difficulty in navigat-
ing the waters of electronic discovery.214 There is no indication in the
record that Morgan Stanley represented that it could not produce certain
e-mails because they had been lost as a result of the "'good faith' rou-
tine operation of an electronic information system."'21 5 Morgan Stanley
also made no representations that its back-up tapes could not be
searched for relevant e-mails or could do so only at great cost and diffi-
culty.2" 6 Instead, as previously noted, the misconduct was analogous to
a situation where a litigant represents to the court that it has produced all
relevant documents in its paper files when it is aware that there exists a
213. Id. at *7.
214. See generally Coleman 11, 2005 WL 674885; Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan
Stanley & Co. (Coleman 1), No. 502003CA005045XXOCAI, 2005 WL 679071 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
Mar. 1, 2005).
215. See Report, supra note 7, at C-85
216. Morgan Stanley's cost and undue burden argument induced CPH to enter into the Agreed
Order. However, this argument was an outright fabrication, as demonstrated by the undisclosed
existence of the Morgan Stanley archive and its attendant searching capability.
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warehouse full of filing cabinets containing potentially relevant docu-
ments but has made no real effort to review those documents.
On March 23, 2005, the court entered another sanctions order in
light of further discovery misconduct that had been uncovered since the
February 14, 2005 sanctions hearing. 2 17 That order increased the sever-
ity of the sanctions imposed by: (1) providing that certain facts set forth
in CPH's Amended Complaint be read to the jury and that the jury be
instructed that such facts were deemed established for all purposes in the
action; and (2) providing that a statement be read to the jury setting forth
in detail all of Morgan Stanley's discovery misconduct in this action and
instructing the jury that it may consider those facts in determining
whether Morgan Stanley sought to conceal its offensive conduct when
determining whether an award of punitive damages is appropriate.218
Among other things, the newly discovered information showed that
Morgan Stanley: (1) had misrepresented to the court, under oath, the
amount of electronic data that it had located;2 19 (2) had not made a good
faith search for its back-up tapes because it had only recently discovered
an additional 6,925 back-up tapes; (3) had not advised the court and
CPH of software errors in its search process that resulted in certain data
not being collected; (4) had intentionally withheld information regarding
an SEC investigation into its e-mail retention policy; and (5) had inten-
tionally withheld information about an SEC investigation into whether
Morgan Stanley had violated the SEC's cease and desist order relating to
the overwriting of backup tapes.22°
Again, there was no evidence that Morgan Stanley was unable to or
had difficulty meeting CPH's discovery requests because of problems
unique to electronic discovery.2 1 The evidence presented to the court
showed that Morgan Stanley made a conscious decision not to conduct a
good faith search for relevant electronic information and then made mis-
representations to the court to prevent the discovery that it had not made
a good faith effort.222
The court also took note of Morgan Stanley's desire to cheat,
observing that
217. Coleman I1, 2005 WL 674885, at *9.
218. Id. at *10.
219. Id. at *6. Morgan Stanley told the Court that it had located 600 gigabytes of data but
contemporaneously told the SEC that it had located a terabyte of data. The 400 gigabyte
difference - as alluded to above - is enormous. Id.
220. Id. at *6-*7; Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc.v. Morgan Stanley & Co. (Coleman 1), No.
502003CA005045XXOCAI, 2005 WL 679071, at *5 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 1, 2005).
221. See generally Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co. (Coleman II),
No. CA 03-5045 Al, 2005 WL 674885 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2005); Coleman 1, 2005 WL
679071.
222. Id.
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[i]t is now clear why MS & Co. was so unwilling to provide CPH
with basic information about how and when the tapes were found or
when production would be complete. First, candor would have
required MS & Co. to admit that it had not done a good faith search
for the oldest full backup tapes, and that Riel's certificate of compli-
ance was false. Some unsearched tapes had been found by 2002;
others had been found no later than May 2004. Together, over 2,000
tapes had been found which were not searched prior to the May pro-
duction. It is untrue that the tapes were "not in locations where e-
mail backup tapes customarily were stored." Second, MS & Co. des-
perately wanted to hide an active SEC inquiry into its e-mail reten-
tion practices. Finally, MS & Co. did not want to admit the existence
of the historical e-mail archive, which would expose the false repre-
sentations it had made to the Court and used to induce CPH to agree
to entry of the Agreed Order.223
Moreover, the court imposed the sanctions because it concluded
that Morgan Stanley's pervasive discovery misconduct had made it
impossible to cure the prejudice to CPH and had "call[ed] into doubt all
of [Morgan Stanley's] discovery responses. 22 4 The only way that the
court could level the playing field was to impose the sanctions.
C. Coleman's True Meaning: The Theory of Sanctions and
Their Wise Imposition
Coleman - essentially an old-fashioned fraud on the court that
arose in the context of electronic discovery issues - provides valuable
insight regarding the imposition of sanctions in an electronic age. A
court's authority to impose sanctions derives from the statutory powers
provided by the legislature, as well as from the court's own inherent
power to control the litigants and to guarantee the integrity of the court
and its proceedings.225 Sanctions serve four purposes that are both case-
specific and systemic. First, sanctions serve to deter litigants from
avoiding their obligations under the discovery rules, which would other-
wise be rendered ineffectual without the threat of punishment for their
violation.226 Second, they serve to punish litigants for wrongful conduct
223. Coleman H, 2005 WL 674885 at *5.
224. Id. at *9.
225. See Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991). For a discussion of the bases for a
court's authority to impose sanctions, see generally Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and
Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1677, 1678 (2004); Stephen B. Burbank,
Sanctions in the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Questions
About Power, 11 HOFSTRA L. Rav. 997, 997-1011 (1983).
226. See Nat'l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976) ("[T]he
most severe in the spectrum of sanctions provided by statute or rule must be available to the
district court in appropriate cases, not merely to penalize those whose conduct may be deemed to
warrant such a sanction, but to deter those who might be tempted to such conduct in the absence
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or disrespect of the integrity of the legal process. 22 7 Third, sanctions
have curative objectives - to restore the prejudiced party to the same
position he would have been in had the opposing party faithfully dis-
charged its discovery obligations. 228 This goal, in particular, is suited to
the preclusionary sanctions (as to plaintiff misbehavior) or default sanc-
tions (as to defendant misbehavior) because sometimes the playing field
cannot be leveled. Fourth, sanctions encourage respect for the judicial
system and the court's authority.229
Trial courts generally have broad discretion in crafting a sanction
for discovery abuse. 2 3 0 Due process requires that the court: (1) "ask
whether there is a sufficient relationship between the discovery and the
merits sought to be foreclosed by the sanction to legitimate depriving a
party of the opportunity to litigate the merits;" and (2) "determine
whether the party guilty of a failure to provide discovery was unable to
comply with the discovery. '"231
In weighing the application of sanction rules, courts might well
consider whether the concealment would have gone undetected but for
the fortuity of a disgruntled employee, the intervention of a
whistleblower, or the occurrence of some other unexpected event. In
such cases, this speaks volumes about whether the conduct was inten-
tional. Likewise, if the matters concealed were central to the adjudica-
tion of the merits - the proverbial "smoking gun" - this, too, speaks
volumes. The inability to know the content of what is destroyed may
itself justify an adverse inference.232 Finally, serial or widespread viola-
tions are highly probative; they evince the unmistakable conclusion that
the misconduct could not be an accident.233
of such a deterrent."); 8A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2281 (2d ed. 1994) ("Without adequate sanctions the
procedure for discovery would often be ineffectual."). However, as demonstrated by Coleman,
pickpockets will ply their trade at the gallows whilst their comrades are being publicly hanged:
sometimes even one set of sanctions is not enough to deter continued discovery misbehavior.
227. See Nat'l Hockey League, 427 U.S. at 643.
228. See Zubulake v. USB Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing West
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999)).
229. The Washington Supreme Court in Fisons Corp., discussed above in the text
accompanying notes 56-69, reversed the trial court and held that the failure to impose sanctions
was an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Washington State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v.
Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d 1054, 1085 (Wash. 1993). The court was obviously mindful of the
potential breakdown of judicial authority if it failed to intercede. Id.
230. WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, supra note 226, § 2284.
231. Id. § 2283.
232. A wrongdoer, like Perkins, should not catch a break simply because the concealed
documents were not damaging. In the cases detailed above, the discovery abuse primarily
involved "smoking gun" documents. In some cases, however, the sin of withholding was more
prejudicial than the withheld documents themselves.
233. See generally, Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co. (Coleman II),
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In the context of electronic discovery, two concerns generally guide
state and federal courts in determining whether to impose sanctions: (1)
whether a party has been prejudiced by the non-production, late produc-
tion, or incomplete production of discoverable information; and (2)
whether the party charged with failing to provide the requested discover-
able information acted willfully or in bad faith.234
In a survey of written opinions in the sanctions arena since January
1, 2000, Judges Shira Scheindlin and Kanchana Wangkeo found that
courts willingly imposed sanctions, regardless of culpability, where a
party had been prejudiced by incomplete or non-compliant discovery
responses. 23 The goal of the sanctions was to place the party in the
position that they would have been in had they obtained the requested
discovery.236 Accordingly, the sanctions of choice were evidentiary
sanctions or adverse inference instructions.237
Scheindlin and Kanchana also found, however, that courts were
unwilling to ignore intentional discovery misconduct, even if it caused
little or no prejudice to the opposing party. 238 The courts' concerns
under such circumstances included both the need to deter obstructionist
behavior to protect the integrity of the court's orders and its ability to
control proceedings.239 Thus, where defiance of the court's authority
was egregious enough, the dismissal of a party's claims or the entry of a
default judgment was considered appropriate.24 °
Ultimately, Judges Scheindlin and Kanchana concluded that there
existed a sliding scale between the elements of willfulness and
prejudice, i.e. the more willful the discovery violation, the less prejudice
the courts required before sanctioning a party, and vice versa.241 On the
other hand, the most extreme sanctions may be imposed for deliberate
and egregious misbehavior whose consequences fall far short of altering
a level playing field.242 Otherwise, only the irreparable destruction of
crucial evidence would warrant the imposition of extreme sanctions,
allowing a party to commit serial frauds on the court as long as some
means of curing their ill-effects could be found.
No. CA 03-5045 Al, 2005 WL 674885 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2005); Coleman (Parent) Holdings,
Inc.v. Morgan Stanley & Co. (Coleman I), No. 502003CA005045XXOCAI, 2005 WL 679071
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 1, 2005).
234. Scheindlin & Wangkeo, supra note 37, at 80, 84.
235. Id. at 81.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 89, 91
239. Id.
240. See, e.g., id. at 85.
241. Id. at 89.
242. See id.
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Courts are permitted to issue sanctions that are case-dispositive
because, without that power, an incentive exists to practice egregiously
obstructive conduct so long as the gain from the discovery deceit - pro-
tecting the smoking gun - outweighs the potential penalty.243 The
proper focus is whether the misconduct was intentional, not whether the
harm is irreparable. Otherwise, the system would become self-defeating
- begging one to ask, how much fraud and deceit will a court tolerate?
Without severe sanctions, litigants would continue to commit infractions
so long as their financial risk-reward calculations demonstrated that the
consequences of the infractions were less onerous than compliance or
obedience. One must consider whether the discovery violation was the
product of a calculated risk-reward decision since it is undesirable for
litigants to apply game theory with respect to making discovery
decisions.
2 44
Obviously, there is no one-size-fits-all sanctions template. The
combination of variables is endless. Their application must be entrusted
to the trial court's sound discretion. In the end, there must be balance in
imposing sanctions - they should be reserved for the egregious cases
and not used to punish minor infractions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Coleman teaches that with enhanced opportunities to commit dis-
covery violations, litigants require concomitantly strong legal deter-
rence. While there has always been cheating, as the discussed case
studies make evident, Coleman also teaches that the advent of electronic
documents has brought with it new and novel opportunities for the dis-
honest and unscrupulous to conceal evidence via a medium that can
complicate detection.245
Coleman was a high-stakes case where, even after Morgan Stanley
was sanctioned for disobeying a court order and not complying with
regulatory rules, the misconduct continued. "The nuclear option" - case
dismissal or default judgment - may therefore be needed more than ever
to deter misconduct and prevent a "wild west" litigation environment.
243. See Greviskes v. Universities Research Ass'n, 417 F.3d 752, 758 (7th Cir. 2005) ("The
district court may dismiss a case for discovery violations or bad faith conduct in litigation under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 or under the inherent authority of the district court.").
244. The calculus is similar to a strategy of committing tax fraud and then trying to settle if
you are caught; telling a lie and not getting caught is not the same thing as telling the truth.
245. As Taylor states, "[s]omething is very wrong when even first-rate lawyers cannot contrive
discovery requests exquisite enough to prompt their adversaries to cough up highly relevant
documents that the defense lawyers have in hand." Taylor, supra note 59, at 78-79. If they're
doing this with paper, what about documents found only on the computer? Or, is this a
commentary not on the medium but the process itself?
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Given the comments on why lawyers (or parties) commit discovery vio-
lations, the penalties must be sure and decisive. Otherwise, one can
imagine serial violations and abuses which are the product of careful
risk-reward calculations. As Taylor observed:
Chief Justice James Andersen's opinion also stressed that "a spirit of
cooperation and forthrightness during the discovery process is neces-
sary for the proper functioning of modem trials." He said that "con-
duct is to be measured against the spirit and purpose of the rules, not
against the standard of practice of the local bar .... Misconduct,
once tolerated, will breed more misconduct, and those who might
seek relief against abuse will instead resort to it in self-defense. 246
In this regard, Zitrin and Langford note the inadequacy of monetary
remedies to curb calculated risk-reward decisions:
Monetary sanctions alone are simply insufficient to deter discovery
abuse. But judges have the power to stem the tide by the more liberal
use of issue sanctions. These sanctions range from determining spe-
cific issues adversely to the offending side, to making an adverse
finding on liability, to striking a party's answer, as a Nebraska judge
did in a 1997 case. They work because they have a direct effect on
the outcome of a case. Most judges are reluctant to use such extreme
remedies. But unless members of the bench are willing to do more
than complain, and start acting on what they see, the deterrent to
future abuses simply won't be enough. If we want discovery abuses
stopped, it will require greater consequences than money.247
The Zitrin and Langford commentary seeks to plumb the motives of
the practitioners because an understanding of the motives may help one
recognize what is needed to curb the misconduct. The picture presented
is not pretty:
Why would Alston & Bird risk such disapprobation? Why did Bogle
& Gates engage in a repeat performance? The answer, unfortunately,
is that discovery is such a high stakes game - and such a vital profit
center for some law firms - that monetary sanctions, even in the hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars, are too often seen as simply the cost of
doing business.248
Zitrin and Langford proceed to note the absence of adverse fallout to
those implicated in these incidents:
Both Alston & Bird and Bogle may have suffered from a temporarily
sullied reputation, but the ultimate effect on their pocketbooks was
relatively minimal - undoubtedly a small fraction of the fees they had
charged. Bogle's mea culpas aside, the two lawyers primarily
246. Id. at 76-77.
247. Zitrin & Langford, supra note 54.
248. Id.
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responsible for the Fisons discovery remained with the firm in good
standing. The younger one was even promoted to partner.249
Taylor, too, took note of the fact that Fisons eloquently spoke to
the "going rate" of conduct at the bar - Bogle recruited fourteen lawyers
and professors as "experts" to speak on its behalf in a case where justice
came within a hair's breadth of woeful perversion:
It would be easy to dismiss this sad story as simply one episode of
rogue lawyering by a single big law firm and its client. But it's more
than that, judging by the parade of leading lights that stepped up to
defend Bogle. In the view of Bogle's 14 distinguished litigation
experts (and of Judge French), the kind of ducking and dodging that
took place in this case is a routine aspect of the discovery process,
and is permitted and (some say) even required by the rules of profes-
sional ethics.
The conduct that these experts condone - after describing it in
highly euphemistic terms - is not just a lawyers' game. It causes real
injustice, by denying essential evidence to wronged parties like the
Pollocks and Dr. Klicpera. The discovery process, and indeed the
legal process, fail in their most basic functions when they fail to
unearth such highly relevant documents, and thus allow the truth to
be concealed, denied, and perverted.25°
While one may have reservations about the liberality of discovery,
particularly as the system may be set up with respect to electronic dis-
covery, there is one thing about which no doubt can be tolerated: once
there are rules in place, all must play by those rules, regardless of beliefs
as to their soundness. This applies doubly to lawyers; otherwise, a
license is created to violate rules with which lawyers profess not to
agree.
Against this backdrop, Coleman clearly was correctly decided. It
may be viewed as an old-fashioned case of contumacious conduct, fraud
on the court, and corruption of the judicial process - involving deliber-
ate spoliation and discovery abuse. It is a case that would be decided the
same way if it had taken place twenty years ago in the paper era.25'
249. Id.
250. Taylor, supra note 59, at 77-78.
251. Had the new amendments to the Federal Rules governed in Coleman, they would not have
altered the outcome. Even if Rule 37(f) had been available to Morgan Stanley, it would not have
provided a lifeline to rescue Morgan Stanley from the discovery quagmire that it had created for
itself. Rule 37(f)'s safe harbor provision would have been inapplicable. The heart of the
discovery dispute between Morgan Stanley and CPH was not the destruction of electronic
information during the routine good faith operation of an electronic information system, but rather
the purposeful withholding of potentially relevant information contained within an electronic
information system. Indeed, much of the rationale for the sanctions had nothing to do with the
electronic nature of the requested discovery; some sanctions related to misbehavior having
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Indeed, the ultimate sanction in Coleman was imposed in the face
of the clear failure of a prior sanctions order to deter Morgan Stanley
from further misconduct. 252  One is reminded of the pickpockets that
plied their trade at the Tyburn gallows whilst their comrades were being
publicly hanged.
Even more remarkably, in November 2002, Morgan Stanley was
one of five firms that agreed to pay SEC regulators a total of $8.25 mil-
lion for failing to properly retain, and maintain in readily-accessible sta-
tus, internal e-mails.2 53  Until January 2001, Morgan Stanley
systematically overwrote e-mail backup tapes every year, a practice
which violated SEC rules requiring the firm to keep the e-mails readily
accessible for at least two years. 4 Morgan Stanley's concealment of
electronic documents in the Coleman litigation included its failure to
disclose prior discipline by a federal regulatory agency for violating e-
mail retention rules.
The court's approach to Morgan Stanley's discovery misconduct
was both measured and appropriate.25 5 The court held two hearings.256
After the first hearing, the court imposed sanctions that were commensu-
rate with the discovery misconduct disclosed at that hearing. 7 It was
only after the second hearing, where it was revealed that Morgan Stanley
had engaged in a pattern and practice of purposefully avoiding its dis-
covery obligations and lied to the court about its efforts, that the court
entered the partial default sanction 8.25  The entry of the partial default
judgment against Morgan Stanley was in no sense the court's knee-jerk
reaction to a first sign of wrongdoing.
Coleman has its critics. For some, the case was a poster child for
those concerned about the pitfalls of electronic discovery because,
superficially, it appears to be a paradigm of the misuse of the discovery
nothing to do with electronic documents, while the principal sanctions for the electronic discovery
misbehavior related to the knowing concealment of information resources that were available but
which Morgan Stanley chose, deliberately, not to disclose or to search. Of course, the ultimate
sanction was imposed only after Morgan Stanley had lied to the court about compliance with a
prior sanction order - showing that even one sanction did not deter further egregious misconduct.
252. See Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co. (Coleman II), No. CA 03-
5045 Al, 2005 WL 674885 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2005).
253. See Storage Strategies: A New IT Challenge, http://www.nec-gss.com/topics/usa/2003/
030226.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2006).
254. See More E-mail Problems, More Fines for Morgan Stanley, http://informationweek.com/
showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=187202749 (last visited Sept. 21, 2006).
255. See Coleman 11, 2005 WL 674885; at *9-10; Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc.v. Morgan
Stanley & Co. (Coleman 1), No. 502003CA005045XXOCAI, 2005 WL 679071, *6 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
Mar. 1, 2005).
256. See Coleman H, 2005 WL 674885, at *9-10; Coleman 1, 2005 WL 679071, at *6.
257. See Coleman 1, 2005 WL 679071, at *6-7.
258. See Coleman 11, 2005 WL 674885, at *8-9.
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process for tactical gain. Indeed, an article appearing in the August
2005 issue of SmartMoney, authored by Roger Lowenstein, sought to
excuse Morgan Stanley's conduct with public relations spin, painting
old-fashioned fraud by the discovered party as electronic abuse by the
discovering party. 25 9 The article claimed that CPH - represented by the
law firm where the authors of There Ought to be a Law practiced - tried
to "put the theory into practice" by the use of aggressive discovery to
trip up Morgan Stanley.26 °
Nothing could be further from the truth. Coleman was an old-fash-
ioned case of egregious fraud on opposing parties and the court. That
this fraud occurred, in part, in the context of discovery involving the
production of electronic documents is of no moment to its venality.
Morgan Stanley first failed to take the claim seriously and then tried to
wear down its opponent - a strategy that backfired. Morgan Stanley
was directly implicated in the misconduct which was severe, repeated,
and had little to do with the nature of the material being discovered. The
serial discovery failures were the subject of serial cover-up efforts
designed to protect Morgan Stanley's prior lies. The misconduct
included repeated misrepresentations to the court and the opposing
party, including misrepresentations about compliance with court orders.
Morgan Stanley, however, was not deterred from continuing its fraud on
the court even after it had been sanctioned once. In other words, Cole-
man was not a case involving the effort to burden an opposing party
with unlimited electronic discovery, and the Lowenstein article repre-
sents nothing more than an effort to provide old-fashioned fraud a refuge
in faux respectability.26
In the end, Coleman teaches that old-fashioned discovery abuse
should not be tolerated and underscores the need for vigilance and the
imposition of severe sanctions to deter the most appalling litigation mis-
conduct. The Morgan Stanley problems were so widespread that the
inescapable conclusion was that Morgan Stanley had engaged in a pat-
tern and practice of deliberate deception. The Coleman sanctions, then,
259. See Roger Lowenstein, Unconventional Wisdom - Justice Done? Or Denied?,
SMARTMONEY, Aug. 1, 2005, at 56.
260. See Solovy & Byman, supra note 18.
261. See Lowenstein, supra note 259. The Lowenstein article contains other serious errors.
Lowenstein ignores that the electronic discovery requests were mutual and typical for a case of
this size and type. He ignores that Morgan Stanley deliberately withheld information about its
electronic resources and prior SEC discipline. He ignores that the discovery failures came to light
only as the result of a whistleblower. He ignores that but for the whistleblower, the discovery
fraud would have evaded detection. He ignores that Morgan Stanley failed to come clean even
after the court imposed one set of sanctions. Finally, he suggests that even CPH was surprised by
the outcome, notwithstanding the fact that economic losses were some $600,000,000, and
exemplary damages were sought by reason of the fraud.
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were eminently well-decided; the punishment clearly fit Morgan Stan-
ley's crime.
By the same token, if the punishment is to fit the crime in other
cases, discovery should not become a trap for the unwary. In the end,
the litigation process should represent a fair search for truth, involving
zealous advocacy by practitioners operating within the rules, not a tour-
nament where victory awaits the dirty fighter and professional mores
become "a race for the bottom.
262
262. The Volokh Conspiracy, A Race to the Bottom, http://www.volokh.com/posts/
l128791484.shtml (last visited Sept. 21, 2006).
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